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Perception Naturalised: Relocation and the Sensible Qualities 
      
ABSTRACT 
This paper offers a partial defence of a Sellarsian-inspired form of scientific 
realism. It defends the relocation strategy that Sellars adopts in his project of 
reconciling the manifest and scientific images. It concentrates on defending the 
causal analysis of perception that is essential to his treatment of sensible qualities. 
One fundamental metaphysical issue in perception theory concerns the nature of 
the perceptual relation; it is argued that a philosophical exploration of this issue is 
continuous with the scientific investigation of perceptual processes. Perception, it is 
argued, can, and should be naturalised.  
A challenge for any account of perception arises from the fact that a subject's 
experiences are connected with particular objects. We need to supply principled 
grounds for identifying which external physical object the subject stands in a 
perceptual relation to when they have an experience. According to the particularity 
objection presented in the paper, naive realism (or disjunctivism) does not 
constitute an independently viable theory since, taken on its own, it is unable to 
answer the objection. In appealing to a 'direct experiential relation', it posits a 
relation that cannot be identified independently of the underlying causal facts. A 
proper understanding of one central function of perception, as guiding extended 
patterns of actions, supports a causal analysis of perception. It allows us to draw up 
a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for perceiving that avoids well-known 
counterexamples. An analysis of this kind is congruent with the scientific account, 
according to which experiences are interpreted as inner states: sensible qualities, 
such as colours, are in the mind (but not as objects of perception). A Sellarsian 
version of the relocation story is thus vindicated.  
 
Key words: Causal theory of perception, manifest image, naive realism, 
navigational account, perceptual content, relocation, scientific realism, sensible 




Science, according to a longstanding realist tradition, is continuous with 
philosophy. Philosophical analysis can help to clarify the basic categories which we 
need to employ in any conceptual scheme, such as substance and property; while 
science, and in particular physics, can reveal the detailed nature of the fundamental 
substances that ground the truths about the actual world. Scientific realism claims 
that the scientific and metaphysical pictures of the world can be unified along these 
lines. In this paper I shall defend this tradition indirectly, by focusing on one 
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particular problem area in philosophy that has attracted much recent attention, the 
nature of the perception. 
 
The question, 'what is it for a person to see a given object X?' can be interpreted in 
two different ways (I concentrate on seeing as the paradigmatic mode of distal 
perception). It can be understood, first, as a question about the scientifically 
discoverable details of perceptual processes; and second, it can be taken as a 
request for a philosophical elucidation of the nature of seeing: as a metaphysical 
question about the real nature of the visual relation that connects the conscious 
mind with the physical world. 
 
This paper argues that these two projects are much closer than commonly assumed; 
an examination of the metaphysics of seeing needs to make essential reference to 
the role of the causal mechanisms referred to in the scientific account, while adding 
nothing of a substantive nature to that account. I argue that the acceptance of a 
broadly Sellarsian critical realist view - one that I have defended in detail in other 
work - provides plausible solutions to key problems in the philosophy of perception 
(epistemic issues aside).1 A scientific account of the process, one that construes 
perceptual experiences as complex inner states related to their perceptual objects by 
a causal chain of an appropriate kind, answers the metaphysical question about 
what the perceptual relation essentially involves. It also shows how the sensible 
qualities that we are aware of in experience are connected to the scientifically 
discoverable properties of physical objects. The science and metaphysics of 
perception are intimately connected; they operate at different levels of detail, but 
both are concerned to elucidate the necessary and sufficient conditions (if such 
there are) that govern the concept of seeing. The argument of this paper is that 
perception can, and should, be naturalised. 
 
One of my main aims here is to show how the analysis of perception bears on 
Sellars's version of the relocation story. This is a central strand in his attempt to 
reconcile the two images we have of ourselves as inhabitants of the world. At the 
same time I shall be arguing that, in turn, the metaphysics of perception has to be 
properly grounded in a scientific understanding of the process. A satisfactory 
account of perception needs to be sensitive to both philosophical and scientific 
considerations about experiences and their proper place in perception. I suggest that 
some of the opposition to the relocation account rests on a failure to appreciate the 
complexity of experiences, and how they can be interpreted as inner states without 
mediating between the subject and the perceived object. With the subject matter of 
perception, as elsewhere, we need to appreciate at the reflective level how things, 
																																								 																				
1 I defend a Sellarsian account of perception in my (2007) and (2009a). 
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in the broadest sense, "hang together" so that apparently different pictures of the 
world can be fused. 
 
 
I The Relocation Story 
In the modern period, a range of issues connected with our conception of the world, 
and our relation to it through perception, came to the fore in the work of Galileo 
and Descartes, Locke and his scientific associates, and other inquirers of the time. 
The developing corpuscular picture of the world generated a tension between the 
scientific image, and our common-sense set of beliefs about the nature of objects, 
beliefs Sellars categorizes as belonging to the "manifest image". A central problem 
arises with the acceptance of a causal view of perception, an account that appears 
to necessitate a revision in our views about the nature of colour and the other 
sensible qualities belonging to objects. According to one interpretation of the 
emerging scientific view, the colours that we are aware of through perception are 
not, as we unreflectively assume, objective properties of independent objects, but 
should instead be relocated on the subjective side of experience.   
  
This relocation story has been adopted in one form or other by a number of 
philosophers. It was defended by Russell throughout most of his career.2 It was 
advocated by some members of the early twentieth century American school of 
critical realists that included Roy Wood Sellars, and subsequently by many others, 
including Wilfrid Sellars, Feigl, and Maxwell, and more recently by Lowe and 
Heil.3 One unifying thread in much of their writings is that the deep truths 
discoverable through science should guide us in our claims about the fundamental 
entities that make up the world.4  
 
According to the ideas outlined by Wilfrid Sellars in his (1962), our thinking about 
the world originates with what he terms the 'original' image of man-in-the-world, 
where the basic substances are taken to be persons, or objects such as trees, rocks, 
and rivers, conceived of as truncated persons.5 This ur-picture is then refined as a 
result of empirical discoveries arising from observed correlations, together with the 
																																								 																				
2 See especially Russell (1927). 
3 See Sellars (1962) and other works; Feigl (1967), Maxwell (1970), Lowe (1996) and 
Heil (2012). 
4 There are indeed other strains in Sellars's philosophy; however, I draw here on the 
strong "right-wing" interpretation that emphasizes Sellars's commitment to scientific 
realism. 
5 Sellars developed these ideas in his (1962) paper; bare page references will refer to it 
as it appears in his (1963) collection. 
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exercise of inductive practices (of a straightforward kind), and also through the 
processes of categorial revision. What Sellars calls the 'manifest image' is an 
idealization of that side of our thought which does not involve the postulation of 
imperceptible entities. In the manifest image, we think of the fundamental objects 
as persons, or as inanimate objects that are the bearers of the sensible qualities we 
observe in perception. The manifest image is the world of common sense, in which 
items such as apples really are coloured as we unreflectively take them to be.  
 
Now it is important to note here that, for Sellars, the sophisticated refinements of 
our common sense thinking only go so far: colours as they belong to objects are 
understood in the manifest image in a categorical way, as occurrent properties of 
things that are identical with the kinds of colours we see them to be. Colour in the 
manifest image is an objective feature of objects that they have independently of 
our experience of them. The pink ice cube is not to be identified with a mere 
complex of colourless imperceptible particles, bearing only primary qualities, as it 
would be on the scientific account.   
 
The scientific image of man is seen also by Sellars as an idealized construct. 
Through the construction of theories relating to the behaviour of hypothesized, 
imperceptible, particles and forces, and the resulting dialectical interplay of 
correlational and postulational procedures, we arrive at a physicalist conception of 
a human being as a complex physical object on a par with other physical things, a 
law-governed 'swirl of physical particles, forces and fields' (p. 20). The tension 
between this conception of the world and that of the rival manifest image figures 
most strikingly in respect of bodily sensations, and our experiences of the 
perceptible qualities of objects, such as colour. The manifest image also purports to 
offer an alternative to the scientific image in two other ways, in so far as we 
conceive of ourselves as (i) persons having the ability to choose and act freely, and 
(ii) being answerable to socially governed norms of value and rationality.  
 
Sellars holds that these latter two essential features of the manifest image can be 
joined with the scientific image in what he describes - somewhat metaphorically - 
as a stereoscopic or synoptic view, in which the two images are unified. However, 
the treatment of perceptible qualities requires a different reconciliation strategy, 
and involves two phases.6 The scientific image proceeds methodologically from 
developments within the manifest image, and purports to absorb the latter image 
and present a complete picture of the way things are. Indeed, with respect to 
fundamental ontology - understood as portrayed in the still-to-be completed 
																																								 																				
6 Compare O'Shea (2016), section 2, where Sellars's different strategies for dealing 
with the points of tension between the images are noted. 
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scientific conception of the world - Sellars asserts the primacy of the scientific 
image (p.32). Persons are reconceived as complex physical systems, interacting 
causally with other physical complexes, often through the transmission of 
imperceptible particles, waves and the like. As we revise our ideas about the real 
physical nature of the world, spatial and mathematical conceptions of physical 
properties occupy a dominant position, and there is no longer a place for sensible 
qualities, in the form that they appear to us, in the causal account of our 
interactions with the world. In this first phase the idea develops of an inner 
experience, a type of inner state of persons common to the cases of veridical, 
illusory and hallucinatory experience, in which it seems to a subject as if they were 
perceiving an object.  
 
The first phase of the relocation story is intertwined with the considerations about 
the way we arrive at an understanding of our own perceptual states, which Sellars 
examines in the concluding parts of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind 
(1956). The essential point for our purposes here is that the pinkness that we 
initially take to be in the external world is re-interpreted as a subjective feature of 
our own perceptual experiences. Hence one aspect of the reconciliation strategy 
involves, in broad terms, the relocation of pinkness from the external world into 
the mind. The pinkness is properly conceived of as a nonconceptual component of 
a complex inner state of the perceiver. As Sellars rightly notes, it is present in the 
mind 'other than as merely thought of'.7 (Sellars's two-component analysis of 
experiences is a key part of his overall views about the mind, and one to which I 
shall return later.) Although experiences of pink are conceptually ("logically") 
connected with the normal external cause of pinkness, they are ontically 
independent of the particular external objects that happen in each case to contribute 
to their occurrence. 
 
Once the perceptible qualities of manifest objects are given their real locus in 
sensation (p.36), at least in as far as we perceive them, a question then arises about 
the status of the colours as they characterise objects in the external world 
independently of our experiences. How, in other words, are manifest objects, with 
their apparent properties, related to the physical things that the atomist views 'as the 
systems of imperceptible particles lacking the perceptible qualities of manifest 
nature' (p.26)?  
 
Operating within the manifest image, when I look at a pink ice cube, I take that 
external physical object to be pink. Yet the pinkness that I am nonconceptually 
																																								 																				
7 As Sellars emphasizes in his (1982) section 92, and also in (1975) Lecture I, sections 
44-55. 
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conscious of is, in reality, an aspect of my inner state. The pink ice cube, the 
external physical object I see, is, in the normal case, the direct object of my 
perceptual experience; however, there is no nonconceptual direct experiential 
relation to the ice cube.8 So when we revise the manifest image, and relocate the 
pinkness that is present in experience, we do not need to postulate any exact 
likeness between the nonconceptual component of inner experience and its distal 
cause, the physical volume of pink I see. We can appreciate, at least in principle, 
how it is that the primary qualities of objects, involving the capacity to emit light 
waves or similar, can produce events in our sense-organs that lead through a chain 
of causes to the neurological events that ultimately give rise to the subjective 
consciousness of pinkness. The final stages of this transmission remain a mystery 
to us at the present time. Yet the relocation account renders superfluous the 
attribution of an exactly matching pink property to the perceived external object. 
We do not need to interpret the objective character of pinkness in terms of a 
primitive emergent property of pinkness somehow instantiated by the complex 
system of particles which is the physical object that I see; nor, as I shall argue later 
on, is it necessary to postulate pinkness as a primitive property somehow 
supervening upon the whole objective physical structure (or just upon its surface).9 
There are strong arguments available to support the view that spectral reflectance 
profiles and the appeal to suitable kinds of isomorphism will satisfy the 
requirements of a scientific explanation of the objective nature of physical colour.10   
 
One line of criticism of Sellars's account has recently been advanced by David 
Rosenthal.11 He criticizes Sellars's version of the relocation story on the grounds 
that it is founded upon a mistaken treatment of the nature of physical objects as 
they exist independently of being perceived. He argues that physical properties like 
colour can be accounted for in the emerging corpuscular conception of the physical 
world, claiming, 'It's only as we consciously perceived colours and other proper 
sensibles that the need to relocate arises. Insofar as such properties occur 
independent of our consciously perceiving them, there is nothing that resists 
thoroughgoing mathematical treatment . . . ' (p.153). For Rosenthal, when we 
reflect on our common-sense view of the world, the problem of experienced colour 
is simply a problem about consciousness; it is not a problem about the physical 
nature of colour.  
																																								 																				
8 That is, there is no direct experiential relation to the ice cube or its physical 
properties that constitutes a nonconceptual aspect of the subject's experience. 
9 For additional argument along these lines see Heil (2012) chapters 4 and 13. 
10 Or perhaps better, spectral productance profiles; see the account defended in Byrne 
and Hilbert (2003). 
11 In Rosenthal (2016). 
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But this criticism ignores the point noted above, that for Sellars, in the manifest 
image, it is physical objects as they exist independently of our experiences that are 
coloured, as he notes, 'in the occurrent, aesthetically interesting sense, as contrasted 
with Lockean powers . . .'.12 Sellars's reason for this claim does not rest on a view 
about our consciousness of colours in perception, but on our common-sense view 
about the nature of physical colours, as they are in themselves. Rosenthal defends 
his position by quoting a claim made by Sellars in the Carus Lectures: 
 
  'The esse of cubes of pink is sentiri'.13  
 
However, this is a misleading extract. The full Sellars quotation from which 
Rosenthal selects these words actually runs as follows:  
 
 'On the Cartesian recategorization, then, the esse of cubes of pink is percipi 
 or, to use a less ambiguous term, sentiri.'  
 
In other words, it is only after we have relocated the colours of objects (as we 
begin to develop the scientific image) that we take them to be essentially connected 
with our sensory consciousness. Before we reflect on what the colours of objects 
really are, and about how we are conscious of them, our conception of physical 
colour is of an objective property that exists out there in the world in the way it 
appears to us, independently of our experiences. It is this common-sense (or 
manifest image) conception of objects that clashes with the scientific conception of 
things, and generates problems for our theories about fundamental ontology.14 
 
It is not always appreciated that, to a large extent, what drives Sellars's argument is 
the in principle subjective indistinguishability between cases of veridical, illusory 
and hallucinatory experiences. This is something he notes, without extensive 
comment, in sections 21 - 24, and later on, in sections 60 and onwards of his 
lectures, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind; it also appears in his other 
																																								 																				
12 Sellars, (1982) footnote 2. 
13 See Rosenthal (2016), p.153; the full Sellars quotation is from Sellars (1981), 
Lecture I, sec. 66. 
14 Compare the excellent account of Sellars's views on the "conceptual place" of 
colour in the manifest image given in Rosenberg (1982). According to Rosenberg’s 
exegesis of Sellars, 'Our mature concept [in the manifest image] of a physical object's 
(really) being red, then, is ontic through and through. It has no experiential component 
at all, but instead is the concept of an individuated quantum of red . . . '. Ontic here has 
the sense of an entity or stuff that is in the world, as opposed to in the mind. 
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discussions of perception cited here.15 Sellars assumes that the common subjective 
similarity points to a common ontology: the three kinds of subjectively matching 
experiences really do have the same intrinsic nature. Since in the hallucinatory 
cases of seeming to see something red, the experience occurs without there being 
any relevant external object instantiating the redness that the subject is immediately 
aware of, experiences of colour in all three cases must supervene on brain states 
alone, independently of their distal causes in all cases.  
 
For Sellars, this belief that there is a common element in experiences of different 
kinds can only be arrived at after (or together with) an acceptance of the view that 
inner states should be accepted for quasi-theoretical reasons. The similarity of the 
three sorts of experiences can only be grasped when we have formed the concepts 
appropriate for thinking about our own mental states. The idea of some kind of 
direct, pre-conceptual inspection of our own experiences would fall foul of Sellars's 
criticisms of "the given". Sellars initially canvasses the idea that inner sensory 
states might be posited for theoretical reasons early on in Empiricism and the 
Philosophy of Mind at section 22, when noting the similarity of the three kinds of 
experience. However, until that stage is reached, we naturally take the colours that 
we are aware of in experience to be objective properties of the external objects we 
see. Once we have arrived at the scientific image of man, we find that there are 
good scientific reasons for treating experiences as having the same ontological 
nature, in order 'to explain uniformities in sense-perception', as Sellars notes in the 
concluding sections of his (1956).16 
 
Sellars's argument is thus a precursor to the causal-scientific argument advanced, 
independently, by Valberg and Robinson.17 It is important to realise in respect of 
this argument, as deVries observes, that Sellars does not think of philosophy as a 
purely analytic endeavour.18 The kinds of arguments that Sellars brings forward in 
support of the inner state view of sensible qualities are not of a formal deductive 
kind, nor are they based solely upon conceptual analysis. While they may involve 
conceptual considerations, they have much in common with scientific arguments, 
where use is made of the strategy of making inferences to the best explanation, and 
																																								 																				
15 Sellars (1956). Compare for example, section 54 of Lecture I, in his (1975). 
16 This is not to deny that there are tensions between the claims made in Sellars 
(1956), that our reasoning about mental states can be likened to a theory of the mind, 
and his ideas about of the nature of the manifest and scientific images in (1962). See 
the discussions in deVries (2005) and also O'Shea (2007) 
17 See Valberg (1992) and Robinson (1994). 
18 deVries (2005), chapter 1. 
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of seeking the best fit with other elements in an overall theory of the way things 
stand. 
 
The argument implicit in Sellars's work has the following schematic form: 
 
1 It is possible that, when a subject has an experience as of seeing something 
red, they are either veridically seeing something red, or seeing a non-red item that 
looks to be red, or merely hallucinating something red. 
 
2 The possible subjective similarity of veridical, illusory, and hallucinatory 
experiences is good evidence that such similar experiences form a 'common kind' 
and really do have the same intrinsic nature, despite originating in different ways. 
 
3 Hallucinatory cases indicate that an inner experience as of something red 
can occur in the absence of any distal red cause. As far as we can tell, the only 
thing that is causally required for a particular inner experience as of red to occur is 
the subject's brain state. 
 
4 Therefore, given (2) and (3), all experiences are inner states, in the sense 
that their essential nature is independent of any particular object in the external 
world outside of the subject. A subject's brain state on its own is sufficient for an 
experience as of red to occur.  
 
Before I scrutinize the consequences of Sellars's argument, I will briefly consider 
the second phase of Sellars's argument, which concerns the ontology of our inner 
experiences, or, as Sellars's refers to them when speaking of the scientific image, 
our sensation states. Adopting a Kantian inspired two-component account of 
experience, Sellars observes that our perceptual experiences of colours involve 
both an intentional, low-level classificatory component, a "perceptual taking", and 
also a sensory component, a sensation.19 In the taking, the subject has an intentional 
representational state focused on what is believed, or taken, to exist in the world 
surrounding the subject. But, in opposition to purely intentional theories of 
experience, it is argued that the subject's consciousness also contains something 
actual, a non-intentional awareness, a sensation of pink.  
 
Sensations of pink, for Sellars, have an 'ultimate homogeneity', which means that 
they resist easy identification with systems of physical particles in the 
neurophysiological image, the theoretical system that is (in an ontological sense) 
																																								 																				
19 I set out the different aspects of Sellars's theory of experience more fully in my 
(2009a). 
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part of the fuller scientific image. They are inner states of a person, intimately 
connected with their brain states. However, their real nature may only be fully 
explicable when we probe further into questions about the ultimate nature of 
physical objects, when the scientific image is revised to take us beyond our present 
understanding of the physical world. A point that has not always been fully 
appreciated is that for Sellars sensory states are conscious states. But they are not to 
be confused with items such as sense-data; they are not the objects of our 
perceptual experiences, although they do have a causal role in guiding our takings 
about the external world. Nor do sensory states belong in a separate ontological 
category, distinct from that of physical entities; Sellars is firmly opposed to any 
dualist ontology of substance.20  
 
On Sellars's view, at the fundamental level there is just one basic category: physical 
objects and mental events give way to a deeper level of absolute processes, which 
account for both sentient and insentient things.21 An alternative approach, one that 
also aims to defend a unified, broadly physicalist, ontology as on Sellars's account, 
involves the idea of revising our conception of the kinds of properties that can 
belong to physical items at the fundamental level; we should accept that the 
metaphysical ultimates are intrinsically experience-involving. At the fundamental 
level particles can have properties that are experiential, in addition to those 
currently postulated in physics.22  
 
Consciousness presents problems for any metaphysical theory that aims to provide 
a complete account of the fundamental items that make up the world. Not only 
perceptual experiences, but hallucinations, other sorts of sensations, and also other 
kinds of conscious mental states have to be accommodated. So relocating colours 
(and other sensible qualities) in the mind does not generate additional ontological 
problems. It does, however, eliminate any problems that could arise as a result of 
situating colours in the external world. Precisely how we should deal with the 
ultimate analysis of colours is one of the issues arising from Sellars's relocation 
story that, for reasons of space, I am unable to examine in any detail. Here I 
concentrate on issues connected with theories of perception. I focus on the 
implications of the relocation story, and of the clash between Sellars's two images 
of man, for our understanding of the perceptual relation. For the most part I shall 
concentrate on visual perception. 
																																								 																				
20 Sellars defends these various claims in his (1981), Lecture III: 'Is Consciousness 
Physical?'. 
21 Sellars's ideas about absolute processes are defended in detail in Seibt (1990).  
22 See the arguments developed by Strawson in his (2006); for some sympathetic 




II The Analysis of Perception  
Why should we accept the Sellarsian two-component view of experiences, and his 
relocation account of sensible qualities? A great deal of recent work in the 
philosophy of perception has focused on questions about the contents of 
experience. There is considerable debate between naive realists (and their 
associates who uphold versions of what is variously termed 'the relational view' or 
'direct realism', and is also upheld by many disjunctivists) who all favour "the 
object view", and the intentionalists (or representationalists) who advocate "the 
content view".23 
 
I have set out reasons for adopting a two-component analysis more extensively in 
other work, and here I shall be brief.24 It is arguable that neither the intentional 
account, nor naive realism, is convincing on its own as a complete account of 
experience; both fail to do justice to the rich and complex character of perceptual 
consciousness. 
 
One problem for the intentional view of experience lies in providing an adequate 
analysis of the phenomenal, or "what-it-is-like" aspect of perceptual consciousness. 
There are certainly parallels between perceptual states and pure intentional states 
such as thought, since it seems plausible to claim that both kinds of state can share 
similar contents. However, the intentionalist needs to explain what it is that 
distinguishes, for example, the perceptual state of seeing that p from a state of pure 
thought where a subject is thinking that p. The former state seems to involve the 
presence of something actual, and the intentionalist must therefore add something 
to the account in order to capture this additional factor. Whether they are successful 
in doing so is open to question.25 
 
A serious difficulty also arises for the rival view. According to austere versions of 
naive realism, a perceptual experience involves a primitive non-representational 
																																								 																				
23 See, from among the many contributors to the debate, Snowdon (1981), Martin 
(2002), Travis (2004), Brewer (2011), and Logue (2011); and compare Byrne (2001), 
Chalmers (2004), Siegel (2010), and Pautz (2010), and see also the collection 
Brogaard (ed.) (2014). 
24 In chapter 2 of my (2007) and also my (2009b). 
25 In addition to the works cited above, for arguments in favour of the intentionalist 
view see the attempts by Tye ( 2000) and (2009), and by Schellenberg (2010), and for 
criticism, see Block (2003), Johnston (2004), and in particular a more recent paper by 
Papineau (2014). 
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relation to external objects, such that there is the immediate presentation of an 
object's sensible qualities to the subject; no representational state enters into 
conscious experience, whatever the nature of the sub-personal mechanisms that 
might be involved.26 However, without imputing to the subject the exercise of some 
kind of categorisation connected with conscious awareness, it is hard to make sense 
of descriptions of perceptual experiences of the form, 'S is visually aware of F 
rather than of some incompatible property G'. To try to analyse experiences as 
lacking an intentional representational component leaves unexplained how the 
subject has any form of awareness or "appreciation", of the kind of thing that is 
made present in a sensory, or nonconceptual, manner. Perceptual consciousness 
always involves some sort of classification of what we perceive, even if the 
exercise of low-level classificatory representational states sometimes operates at 
only a rudimentary level in consciousness, as when I simply observe that there is 
something in front of me, something dark, or similar.27 However, the exercise of 
classificatory states of a low-level kind does not imply higher-level abilities such as 
self-awareness.28 
 
More recent philosophical approaches to the dispute suggest the beginnings of 
some kind of rapprochement between the two sides. We need to acknowledge both 
the distinctive sensory aspect of experience, and also its intentional nature. It is 
arguable that the only way that we can do justice to the insights of both camps is to 
adopt the two-component account of experience, and this is what I shall do here. I 
shall assume that there are good reasons for analysing (visual) experience as 
containing two distinct dimensions. The first is sensory in kind, involving the 
presentation of qualities, and the second is a cognitive component involving the 
exercise of some kind of intentional state.29  
 
This in turn leads to questions about the metaphysics of perception. The causal 
theory of perception, which I shall elaborate more fully in the argument that 
																																								 																				
26 See in particular Travis (2004) 
27 The use of 'concept' here is not intended to imply self-awareness or other higher 
level abilities; it connotes only a low-level classificatory ability. 
28 Here again, philosophical inquiry merges with scientific investigation. See Milner 
and Goodale (1995) on the thesis that conscious visual experience is a process 
dependent on the ventral system, and essentially linked to recognition of kinds; and 
the discussion of "seeing-as" in Block (2014). 
29 For a defence of the two-component view see the introductory paper by Reiland and 
Lyons (2015) to a special issue on the disunity of perception, and in particular the 
position defended in Berger (2015); compare also the introductory paper by Locatelli 
and Wilson (2017). 
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follows, plays an essential role in the relocation story. I shall show that we cannot 
begin to assess claims concerning the correct analysis of experience and contents 
without first getting a clear view about the function of perceptual processes, 
especially of those involving distal perception, such as vision.  
 
All parties to these disputes about perceptual experience need to provide an answer 
to the more basic question that arises on any view about experience: what is it that 
determines that a subject's perceptual experience E at a given time T be an 
experience of the specific object X that is perceived? What is the perceptual 
relation that connects E and object X? It is arguable that the more fundamental 
debate concerns the nature of this perceptual relation. It is this issue that divides 
causal theorists from naive realists who favour the relational view, and also from 
some of those in the intentionalist camp, who favour phenomenal externalism and 
like views that embrace aspects of naive realism.30 The particularity objection, as I 
call it, shows that neither naive realism, nor the intentional view, constitutes a 
viable theory on its own. 
 
Those who favour the view that experiences have representational contents need to 
acknowledge some form of particular content to experiences. The particular object 
that is perceived is not always experienced as a particular - that is a 
phenomenological matter. Nevertheless, the central defining feature of perception, 
the feature that distinguishes veridical and illusory types of experiences from 
hallucinatory experiences, is that the former type involve a perceptual relation - 
whatever form this takes - between the subject's experience and some particular 
perceptual object (or group of objects).31 If an experience does represent aspects of 
the subject's environment, it must include among its constituents the particular 
object perceived.32 So whichever version of the content view is espoused, there 
remains a deeper problem: What, in principle, grounds the claim that the subject's 
experience E is related to some specific object X, rather than some other - perhaps 
very similar - object Y? Appeals to externalism presuppose that we already have an 
independent means of answering the metaphysical question about the nature of the 
perceptual relation that connects an experience to its material object. 
 
																																								 																				
30 One example is Tye (2009): see the remarks at the start of Chapter 4, and in the 
concluding chapter, where he makes explicit his sympathies for Naive Realism. 
31 It should be noted, therefore, that the particularity point is independent of debates 
about whether experiences have singular contents, as opposed to existential contents, 
and like issues. 
32 For a good discussion of these points see Schellenberg (2016). 
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Naive realists face a parallel problem. They hold that the subject is connected with 
the perceived object by a 'direct experiential relation', a relation whereby the 
subject's experience 'reaches out to and by its nature includes the perceived 
object'.33 The notion of a direct experiential relation has been criticized on the 
grounds that it is very hard to make clear sense of the relation. We are hard put to 
explain in non-metaphorical terms what sort of process the "reaching out" might 
be, or how an external physical thing outside the brain can literally be a constituent 
of a mental state.34 It is not clear whether the view is coherent. There is also a 
deeper objection concerning the kinds of evidence we could have for the existence 
of such a relation. We still need to know what it is about a situation that allows us 
to determine which particular object in the subject's environment is the one that the 
subject stands in the unique experiential relation to.  
 
Naive realism cannot provide an answer to the particularity objection independently 
of an appeal to science. The alleged existence of a direct experiential relation does 
not help in determining which particular object is seen by the subject, in the 
extensional sense. It plays no role either in the common-sense story about 
perception, or in the scientific accounts. If I have a visual experience as of seeing 
my friend Dotty, it is possible that I am seeing her, but for all I know I am actually 
seeing her twin sister Kitty. If I have two successive matching experiences of a 
face, they may relate to the same person, or to two different but exactly similar 
persons. Hence, from my first-person perspective alone I am unable to tell which 
particular object I am experientially related to. From the third-person perspective 
we are able to find out about broad facts that apply to the mode of vision - that 
normally the object seen lies directly in front of the subject - and can consider the 
subject's reports of what they seem to see, but in the absence of full knowledge of 
causal factors we cannot be certain which object the subject sees, or indeed whether 
they are seeing anything at all, rather than hallucinating. It is therefore difficult to 
see what kinds of evidence there could be to show that a direct experiential relation 
holds between a perceiving subject and any particular external object. In 
determining which particular object is seen, we do not try to find a direct 
experiential relation, but look instead to what the science of perception reveals. 
 
Thus on either approach to the content question, it transpires that there is a more 
fundamental issue at stake: answering questions about contents and the objects of 
perception lead on inexorably to questions about the basic metaphysics of the 
perceptual relation: in virtue of which facts is some particular object connected to 
the subject's experience by the perceptual relation? The only adequate answer is 
																																								 																				
33 These quotations are from Hobson (2011) and Snowdon (2005). 
34 I have explored this objection more fully in my (2007).  
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one that appeals to the appropriate causal processes whereby the subject's 
experience is generated by the object (or objects) in the environment.  
 
These considerations imply that we have at the very least to supplement the 
accounts offered by those who favour either the naive realist or the intentional 
view. This is a point that has to be accepted by all parties to the dispute. But it is 
not always realized how deep the particularity objection cuts.  
 
I need to make a point here about the structure of the argument which now follows. 
I have already indicated that I am assuming that experiences combine two distinct 
components, an intentional aspect of some kind, and a non-intentional, or sensory, 
state. It is the sensory component of experience  - the aspect that accounts for the 
pinkness we experience in seeing the pink ice-cube - that concerns us from now on. 
Those who object to the inner state view of sensible qualities understand the 
pinkness to be located out in the external world, in some manner belonging to the 
perceptual object. Such a view is maintained on the austere conception of naive 
realism, but it is also available to a theorist who favours the two-component view 
of perceptual consciousness, and in that form would be a variant of the naive realist 
position.  
 
In the rest of this paper we can set the pure intentional view to one side, for what 
matters is the status of the sensory component. I shall argue that the only viable 
philosophical account of perception is the one that is equivalent to the schematic 
scientific account of what is involved in the process, and which relies essentially on 
a causal analysis of the perceptual relation, in which experiences are understood as 
inner states. In other words, an adequate philosophical account of the perceptual 
relation collapses into the scientific account: perception should be naturalised. 
 
The problem for naive realism is that the theory cannot answer the particularity 
problem, as we have seen. The naive realist might try to resist this conclusion by 
adopting a "combined view": normal perception essentially involves an experiential 
relation, but there is, in addition, a causal relation involved. The idea would be to 
analyse a subject's perception of a particular object as involving two necessary 
conditions. For visual perception the analysis would run as follows: 
 
If S sees a particular object X, then it is necessary both that: 
 
(1) S has a visual experience E that is connected to X by a direct experiential 
 relation;  
 
	 16	
and in addition: 
 
(2) S's experience E is causally related to X. 
 
Let us call this analysis the 'Combined View'. It is one that is often encountered in 
discussions of the particularity objection. However, as it stands, it is fatally flawed, 
since it runs into the same objection that is often raised against causal theories of 
perception, theories which interpret experiences as inner states. To appreciate the 
problem, let us begin with an observation by David Lewis: 
 
 It is not far wrong to say simply that someone sees if and only if the scene 
 before his eyes causes matching visual experience.35 
 
However, as Lewis points out, although we might take such a view for granted 'in 
our ordinary life', it will not suffice to avoid the problems raised by cases of 
deviant causal chains. Here is one illustration: suppose I drink from a glass of water 
containing a pink ice cube that has a trace of a drug; I am caused to hallucinate, and 
by co-incidence, have a visual experience as of a pink ice cube. The conditions set 
out in the suggestion noted by Lewis are met, yet I am not having a genuine visual 
perception of the ice cube in my drink. So as to avoid such counter-examples, we 
need to specify, in a non-circular manner, what type of causal connection is 
appropriate for seeing. If naive realists wish to appeal to a causal condition, they 
too must resolve this problem. 
 
Grice sought to do this indirectly, suggesting that we can specify the appropriate 
causal connection by reference to a paradigm example of seeing. However, this 
approach meets difficulties, as Jackson points out.36 Firstly, there is a suspicion of 
circularity in the account, in order that the demonstrated paradigm example is 
secured as a genuine case of seeing. Secondly, the account threatens to be too 
restrictive. If the identification of a causal mechanism for seeing includes merely 
contingent features of the underlying process, the danger is that the analysis would 
rule out cases where someone sees something by an unusual means, such as the use 
of prosthetic vision.37   
 
There is, however, a way of resolving these problems, which I have elaborated in 
some detail in other work. The proposal is that we modify Grice's suggestion, and 
identify the underlying causal mechanism, the causal route which is appropriate for 
																																								 																				
35 Lewis (1980) p.239. 
36 See Grice (1961), and Jackson (1997), chapter 7. 
37 See, e.g. Noë (2003) 
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seeing, by reference to the general function of vision. Here I briefly summarise the 
central idea of what I term the 'Navigational Picture' of perception, which I have 
defended elsewhere.38 
 
It has often been observed that the role of perception is to arrive at knowledge of 
objects in one's surroundings. Distal modes of perception like seeing yield up-to-
date knowledge about how things are, currently, around one. Seeing is not a static 
activity, but one that is integrated dynamically into our daily life. Thus the test of 
whether someone can see is whether they can pick out a book they want from a 
library shelf, return a serve at tennis, select food from a table of refreshments, cross 
a road safely, or conduct countless other activities which depend in a like manner 
on a perceptual grasp of what is in the surroundings. In the common sense picture, 
we understand perception to be essentially connected with certain extended patterns 
of bodily movements, those we would undertake in moving through an 
environment, guided by our senses, when we classify and interact with things in 
our surroundings. By using visual perception, we are able to classify things at a 
distance, and then navigate through our environment so as to select, examine and 
make use of objects for our benefit (and to avoid harm). Someone who lacks any 
ability to act appropriately cannot be said to see things. 
 
A subject's verbal reports about their visual experiences are not decisive in 
determining what, if anything they see. Where there is some doubt as to whether 
someone is genuinely seeing an object or hallucinating, or about which particular 
object amongst a group of similar objects they are visually attending to, the way in 
which we can in principle decide the issue is by getting them to carry out some 
extended action involving the perceptual object.  
 
Perception is therefore implicitly understood as an important category that helps in 
the classification of patterns of behaviour, and contributes to making sense of a 
person's actions. The investigation of visual perception starts from an implicit 
understanding of the navigational function of vision; we grasp, ab initio, that seeing 
has the essential function of enabling humans and other animals to navigate 
through their surroundings so as to make beneficial use of the objects they see, in 
order to satisfy their needs and avoid harm. It is by selecting examples of 
successful navigational behaviour that we can identify the paradigm cases where 
the subject is caused to have visual experiences that match the objects in the 
environment. In theory, through investigating of these cases, we can determine 
which underlying causal mechanisms are essential for seeing.  
 
																																								 																				
38 I defend the Navigational Picture in some detail in my (2007) and (2015).  
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It is arguable that scientific work on perception implicitly trades on this key insight. 
Appealing to this conception of the function of vision, experimenters can, in 
principle, make identifying reference to the types of underlying physical and 
physiological mechanisms that are essentially involved in the dynamic processes 
involved when we see and act upon distal objects.39  Our a priori grasp of the 
nature of visual perception, as a process having an essential navigational function, 
leads to an account that can be filled out a posteriori, by investigating the 
underlying mechanisms that support successful actions directed at the objects we 
see. To take one example, in the course of investigating the mechanisms involved 
when bats perceptually interact with the world, experimenters noted how they were 
able to successfully navigate through their surroundings under different conditions, 
and discovered which sense organs were operating. Work on animal vision 
involves an understanding of the constraints imposed upon the process, for 
example, by the fact that the underlying mechanisms must operate rapidly so that 
predators are able quickly to categorize and pursue their prey.  
 
I need to emphasize here that by pointing out the conceptual link between visual 
perception and action sequences, I am not thereby endorsing the claim advanced by 
advocates of the sensori-motor account of perception. In contrast with that account, 
the navigational picture defended here construes experiences as inner states, states 
that represent the surroundings in both informational and intentional senses.40 What 
matters is that in the normal case the inner experiences of a seeing subject provide 
the basis for successful action. 
 
Although in the selected paradigm cases the relevant experiences lead to successful 
navigational behaviour, quite obviously there will be countless other situations 
where a subject has visual experiences of objects, yet fails to produce any actions 
as a consequence. Subjects may be free from any pressing desires that would 
motivate them to act. Hence the connection with extended action sequences is 
potential, rather than actual. In the paradigm cases, visual experiences, in 
conjunction with desires, produce successful navigational behaviour. In such cases, 
the perceptual process will supervene in part upon causal processes that we can 
investigate, so as to determine which underlying causal mechanisms are essential. 
But the same underlying processes will also be involved in very many other cases 
where there is no resulting action on the part of the seeing subject. The kind of 
knowledge that is relevant to the exercise of perceptual processes is the kind of 
																																								 																				
39 As noted in the seminal work by Milner and Goodale (1995). 
40 I discuss some of the problems that arise for Noë’s account of perception in my 
(2007) 
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knowledge that the subjects can put to some use, if they chose to, and if they are 
able to do so.41  
 
This approach enables us to specify the causal chain that is appropriate for visual 
perception in a given creature (human or otherwise) modulo a given environment 
and time period. If the navigational account of seeing is on the right lines, then we 
have provided an account of what the perceptual relation is. The causal relation 
between visual experience and object that is appropriate for seeing is the one that 
links a particular object in the surroundings to the subject's inner experience in a 
navigationally supporting way.42  
 
If we accept this picture of visual perception, it also makes plausible the way in 
which the various sciences dealing with vision contribute to resolving the 
metaphysical issues about its essential nature. Here again, the metaphysics and 
science of perception prove to be intimately linked. When experimenters carry out 
tests with subjects on their visual experiences, in most cases they implicitly assume 
that a given experience is identifiable as veridical or illusory. A subjective 
experience type is identified by reference to the subject's reports about what they 
think that they see, independently of knowledge of the surrounding objects. But 
strictly speaking, it is only after we have ascertained the causal role of some object 
in the surroundings in producing an experience, that we are in a position to classify 
a given experience as a veridical one, and to state which is its perceptual object. If a 
subject started to give reports about experiences that failed to match their 
surroundings, we would need to investigate more closely what was going on. 
 
However, on the scientific account, at no point in an investigation would the 
subject's experience be treated as containing the external object as a constituent. 
																																								 																				
41 It is arguable that in the case of an immobile subject we need to make some 
assumptions, either about how they would have acted, had they been able to do so, or, 
ultimately, about their biological similarity to other human beings capable of acting. 
An immobile subject may be able to act by requesting an object, and correcting the 
responses of another who is trying to help them, and so on; in the last analysis it is by 
reference to similarities in their verbal behaviour and neurophysiology that we would 
have grounds for attributions of perceptual contents to them. Thanks to an anonymous 
reviewer for pressing this point. 
42 I have defended a navigational account of perception in my (2007). There are other 
related functions of perception, for example in the close inspection of objects. I 
assume that the basic idea defended here, of identifying the appropriate causal chain 
necessary for perception by reference to function, can be extended to cover these other 
ways in which perception benefits a creature. 
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Throughout scientific investigation, experiences are understood as inner states, 
ontologically independent from the objects that cause them to occur. Veridical, 
illusory and hallucinatory experiences are taken to differ only in their causal 
ancestry.43  
 
Through a circuitous route, we have arrived at the following causal analysis of the 
visual perception of objects, one which is developed from within the manifest 
image, but which contains room for further detailed development, as it is absorbed 
into the scientific image following the acceptance of the relocation story (as early 
vision scientists such as Galileo and Descartes realized).  
 
A subject S sees a particular object X, if and only if: 
 
(1)  X is a physical object external to subject S; 
 
(2) S has an inner visual experience E comprising both sensory and intentional 
 components; 
 
(3) X is a physical object located externally to the subject, which causes the 
 visual experience E to come about in the appropriate manner: the causal 
 mechanism involved is one which is identified as being physically sufficient 
 to enable S to successfully navigate through the environment and make 
 beneficial use of objects.  
 
This analysis sets out the jointly necessary and sufficient conditions for seeing. It 
provides a plausible way of avoiding the deviant causal chains problems. Yet to 
analyse the visual experience as an inner state does not mean that we see objects 
indirectly. As we noted earlier, our perceptual takings, which account for the 
intentional aspects of experiences, are focused in the normal case on the external 
objects we take ourselves to be seeing. In doing so, we project the sensory aspects 
of experience onto the outside world. The fact that inner states are ontologically 
essential to seeing is not reflected at the conceptual level when we perceive the 
world around us.44 
 
This analysis might be tweaked further in various ways; it may be that, seeing is, 
strictly, modulo an environment and a time period for the subject; we should note 
that navigation also has the function of avoiding harmful objects such as predators. 
I ignore here the fact that we speak about seeing events as well as objects, and also 
																																								 																				
43 See for example the work of Gray (2014) and of ffytche (2013). 
44 A projectivist analysis of perception is defended in my (2015). 
	 21	
the point that we can in some sense become aware of "floaters" in the eye, which 
are located within the subject's body; such matters can be accommodated within the 
framework provided by the analysis. I will assume that the conditions make enough 
sense for present purposes, and will not pursue these points further here.  
 
Naive realism adopts a very different view from that of the causalist. The naive 
realist is committed to a mysterious primitive relation that falls outside of the 
scientific accounts. The subject's visual experience somehow contains the very 
external object seen as a constituent. But as we have observed, naive realism faces 
a major problem in determining which item in the surroundings is the perceptual 
object, the particular object that is alleged to be the constituent of the subject's 
experience. 
 
What is important here is that if naive realists opt for the combined view, they 
would have to include in their analysis a causal condition of much the same kind as 
is given in condition (3), so as to meet the sufficiency problem (while at the same 
time construing the experience as object-involving, and not as "inner"). The naive 
realist either has to accept something like the causal account set out in the 
Navigational Picture, in order to specify what kind of causal chain is appropriate 
for seeing, or else has to find some alternative way of solving the problem of 
deviant causal chains. I shall assume in what follows that the account of causation 
set out in the Navigational Picture does provide one reasonable solution to the 
problem, as far as the condition (3) is concerned (adjusted so as to be consistent 
with naive realism).  
 
This leaves the naive realist with two options, neither of which seems plausible. 
The first is the independence option, which rejects the combined view: on this 
option, veridical perception is claimed to be strictly dependent only on the direct 
experiential relation, and logically independent of the kinds of underlying causal 
facts that figure in scientific accounts of the production of perceptual experiences.45 
It is possible, on this option, that the two conditions come apart. A subject might be 
experientially related to an object in cases where they have no causal connection 
appropriate for navigation, and vice versa.  
 
But this option leads to incoherence: imagine a tennis player who is apparently 
functioning as if interacting perceptually with her environment, over an extended 
period of time. Her visual experiences are caused by light waves from objects in 
her surroundings, including from the tennis ball that she strikes so unerringly. 
However, according to the independence option, there might really have been no 
																																								 																				
45 This option is endorsed by Hobson (2011). 
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direct experiential relation operating, so the tennis player might actually have been 
hallucinating for the entire period of play. Conversely, someone might really be 
seeing objects, when no aspects of their visual experiences match features of their 
current surroundings. The independence option cuts off the analysis of perception 
from our normal means of verifying that someone is perceiving, and therefore from 
any way of properly understanding the process.  
 
On the alternative option, the naive realist could try claiming that the direct 
experiential relation is a simple, or primitive, relation that supervenes upon the 
appropriate navigational causal processes leading from external objects to internal 
states of the brain, as understood on the scientific accounts. This thesis about the 
perceptual relation would go hand-in-hand with a primitivist conception of the 
sensible colours immediately present in visual experiences. Colours would be 
understood as irreducible emergent properties of whole objects, even though at the 
level of reference we can equate the object perceived with complex arrangements 
of sub-atomic particles. In support of this position, it might be argued that both the 
phenomenology of experience, and also our ordinary ways of referring to objective 
colours, give reasons for adopting such a view.46 
 
There are, however, difficulties with this account. Even if we can make sense of 
colour primitivism, we are left with an acute problem. On the naive realist view, we 
would still need to postulate the existence of an experiential relation by means of 
which the subject has an awareness of the emergent colours. This is a relation that 
is additional to the scientific account, one for which there is no independent 
evidence, and in respect of which we can provide no clear positive account.47 Once 
																																								 																				
46 See Campbell (1994) and McGinn (1996), and also the indirect reasons given in 
support of emergence in Cumpa (2014). It should be noted that, while on the 
primitivist conception of sensible qualities, colours themselves are considered to be 
non-relational properties, we still need to account for our awareness of them, as the 
ensuing argument indicates. 
47 The appeal to common sense does not help here; in the manifest image that reflects 
our commonsense beliefs, we know that people have experiences of colour, and we 
assume that, for the most part, objects really do have the colours they seem to have. 
We also know that experiences of colour occur to people when no coloured objects are 
present, though usually there is a correlation of experience and objective colour. But 
our commonsense knowledge of the world does not go beyond an awareness or belief 
in such a correlation, and it leaves open the question of what the relation might be. It 
does not include a positive theory about some unique kind of primitive experiential 
relation connecting experiences and objects. As argued above, any such relation 
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we move to an acceptance of the scientific account of perception, the experiential 
relation becomes superfluous.  
 
There are good reasons for accepting that veridical, illusory and hallucinatory 
experiences belong to a common ontological kind, and arise directly as a result of 
brain events which can in turn be caused in a variety of ways. Physical (and 
neurophysiological) processes suffice to produce our experiences of sensible 
qualities like colour. All the causal work in the production of colour experience is 
carried out by the micro-processes that take place at the lower level, according to 
the explanations provided in our best scientific theories. Brain states alone are 
sufficient to produce the conscious experience of colours. We therefore do not need 
to appeal to a further relation holding immediately between the experience and the 
distal object. Neither do we need to interpret colours as emergent properties of 
objects external to the perceiver. The simplest account of perception is that 
provided by the scientific story, when it is properly understood.  
 
These considerations strongly suggest that in answering the metaphysical question 
about what the perceptual relation is, we need appeal only to scientifically 
ascertainable facts. There is no compelling need to add to the scientific account, by 
postulating a primitive experiential relation. The causal theory of perception allows 
a unification of the metaphysics of perception with the kinds of details that careful 




The causal account of perception was first clearly articulated in the work of 
Descartes and Locke. Neither of them conceived of philosophy as a separate 
discipline to be contrasted with scientific investigation. The theory of perception 
that they defended, each in his different way, was a response to what we now term 
"scientific" developments of the time. For Locke in particular, the analysis of 
perceptual processes was part of a comprehensive account of the physical world 
and of our knowledge of it.  
 
We have seen that there is a major difference between what is entailed by the naive 
realist view and by the causal-scientific theory. The naive realist view is committed 
to a primitive kind of relation - a "magic relation" - which falls outside the 
scientific accounts. And since that relation is not reductively analysable in terms of 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 					
would be imperceptible from an external viewpoint; and its absence is compatible 
with the subjective viewpoint. 
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distinct, causally linked, stages, the naive realist is ontologically committed to the 
existence of some higher level of facts that lie beyond the realms explored in the 
sciences. In contrast, the causal theory provides an account that allows perception 
to be naturalised, so that perception fits into the conception of the world which 
emerges in the scientific image.  
 
Nonetheless, serious philosophical problems remain. As Sellars emphasizes, 
philosophy - in this case, the philosophy of perception - makes no substantive 
contribution to what we know.48 Yet it is important to note that the analysis of the 
metaphysics of the perceiving relation does not exhaust the philosophical issues 
connected with the topic. We need, as Sellars observes, to keep an 'eye on the 
whole'. Sellars's conception of philosophy makes a good deal of sense here.  
 
It needs to be shown how the different perspectives we have on the nature of 
perceptual experience can be fused into one consistent overall picture. 
Traditionally, perception has been intimately linked with a range of epistemic 
issues, which here I am putting to one side (it's arguable that they arise for any 
theory of perception). But problems also arise in showing how the above approach 
to metaphysical questions of perception can be reconciled with the phenomenology 
of perceptual experience. I have suggested that a projectionist account offers 
solutions to such challenges. The thesis defended in this paper is that we can, and 
should, provide a naturalised account of perception, an account which harmonises 
with the scientific story about the process. There remains, however, work to be 
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